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Over the past fifteen years, the phenomenon of radicalisation has anew emerged as salient in 
the USA, in Europe and elsewhere. The attacks against the World Trade Centre in New York 
and in Washington DC in September 2001 rendered dramatically visible the growth of radical 
Islam militancy and its destructive consequences. However, the forms that radicalisation takes 
extend well beyond those related to religion-inspired extremism, and their intensity, as well as 
the responses of governments and state authorities significantly vary across countries. 
Prompted by increasing incidents of political violence, primarily but not solely linked to 
Islamist radicalism, scholarly interest in the subject has surged. A wealth of studies explore 
the motives and causes of radicalisation, as well as the processes whereby individuals and 
groups come to espouse radical ideas and engage in violent actions. Islamist radicalisation, as 
well as right-wing extremism have attracted a large amount of research, while left-wing 
extremism has received far less attention since the 1980s when it began to decline (albeit not 
disappear) after its heyday in the 1970s.  
In the countries of Central, East and Southeast Europe though, the phenomenon of 
radicalisation has generally been understudied, despite the fact that extremism and political 
radicalism have been long-standing in most countries in the region. The project RAD 
MONITOR sought to address this gap in research and knowledge. The rise of ‘new’ and the 
resurgence of ‘old’ forms of radicalisation are an emerging issue for policy-makers and there 
is limited understanding of the threats leading to violence, both within policy circles and 
academia. Policy-makers and state agencies face significant challenges in devising 
appropriate strategies to address the factors contributing to extremism and violent 
radicalisation. There is a clear need for research and evidence-based advice on this issue. 
Policy debates on how to confront different types of radicalisation have been ongoing in 
many states in the EU in view of recent global threats. Yet in many member states decision-
makers lack the appropriate evidence base to guide policy actions, especially in the field of 
Islamist radicalisation. 
 In the frame of the RAD MONITOR project, the ELIAMEP team explored the main 
characteristics, causes, organizational features and repertoire of actions of four different kinds 
of radicalization that have been evidenced in Greece: the extreme left radicalization and its 
continuity in the broader anti-authoritarian movement, the far-right radicalization, football 
hooliganism, and Islamic radicalization. While these are entirely different phenomena that 
cannot be treated as comparable to one another, there is a common aspect that ties them 
together: the prime place of violent speech in the ideas and ideologies that they espouse, as 
well as the tendency to deploy violence in their repertoire of actions. The findings from our 
research on the case of Greece is presented and analysed in three reports. 
 Besides exploring the phenomenon of radicalization in Central and Southeast Europe 
(Bulgaria, Greece and the Czech Republic), the second goal of the RAD MONITOR project 
was to develop a tool for the identification and monitoring of radicalization processes, which 
can be used by front-line practitioners. The Radicalization Monitoring Tool (RMT) that was 
developed, contains a series of indicators that reveal tendencies, situations and behaviours 
that may entail the risk of radicalization. The aim of the indicators is to act as a red flag for 
the identification of individuals or groups that are vulnerable to radicalization, or who are in 
the process of crystallizing their motives and/or organize their involvement in acts of political 
violence.  
 This policy report provides a brief overview of the phenomenon of radicalization in 
its different forms in Greece, which is based on the research conducted in the frame of the 
RAD MONITOR project. The second part contains a list of policy recommendations that 
specifically pertain to indicators and tools for the prevention and monitoring of far-right and 




2. The Greek case: an overview 
In Greece, the phenomenon of radicalisation has been present throughout the period from the 
mid-1970s when the country made the transition from a military dictatorship to democracy, 
until today. Greece displays one of the most persistent problems of terrorism in Europe, 
raising anew the question of why extremist and revolutionary organisations continue to 
emerge and be active in democracies. The intensity and nature of political violence in Greece, 
as well as the forms that it takes have evolved over time. Levels of political violence 
originating from far-left groups have remained high in Greece and even rose from the 1970s 
until the 2000s, as data on number of attacks from the Global Terrorism Database shows 
(GTD). The GTD records 1169 incidents between February 1973 and December 2014 of far-
left political violence in Greece. The number of incidents have hiked in particular years and 
periods of time, such as in 1977-78, in 1989-1990, and less so in 1998-99, while they saw the 
highest peak in 2008.1  
In the course of the 2000s, and especially since 2010, right-wing and left-wing 
extremism and radicalisation intensified. In the past seven years, their intensification has 
taken place in the context of a deepening social and economic crisis linked to the country’s 
external debt problems, the adoption of austerity policies, declining incomes and high levels 
of unemployment, especially among the youth. Deteriorating socioeconomic conditions have 
been accompanied by the fragmentation of what used to function as a two-party political 
system and by a profound legitimacy crisis of the Greek political system as we knew it until 
2010. Right-wing extremism and violence have also sharply grown since 2010 and they have 
been substantially connected to the appearance of a far-right political party, the Golden Dawn 
(GD), which has gained representation in the Greek Parliament. The GTD though, as well as 
the EUROPOL Terrorism Reports, do not record attacks by far-right groups, largely due to 
the fact that such data was not recorded by the Greek state itself until 2012.  
In the context of a profound economic, social and political crisis since 2010 in 
Greece, incidents of sports-related violence (hooliganism) have also recorded a considerable 
increase. What is more, far-right and anarchist ideologies, and organised crime have 
apparently penetrated the terraces of sports grounds, creating in this way a system of 
‘communicating vessels’ between organised hard-core fan clubs and extremism. Hooliganism, 
which emerged after the end of the dictatorship in 1974, has become in recent years a youth 
strategy to escape from reality. It has been tolerated and, in some cases, even fomented, 
directly or indirectly, by the boards of sports clubs and sports federations, which has exposed 
the weaknesses of the self-regulated institutional setting of sport (predominantly football) in 
Greece. 
So far, Islamist-related radicalization activity has been limited to a logistical, 
recruitment and support basis. However, Greek authorities declare that they are ‘at a 
heightened state of vigilance’ at the moment, due to the fact that Greece is a Jihadist 
crossover to and from Syria. The large pool of young male irregular immigrants from Muslim 
countries, whose presence is not recorded in official data, in combination with their dire 
living conditions and the lack of formal and monitored places of worship create a fertile 
environment for Islamist radicalisation. 
 
3. Far-right radicalization 
In order to explore the appropriateness and validate the behavioral and situational indicators 
for far-right radicalisation in Greece, we performed a validation study on the basis of a 
                                                          





Situation Assessment analysis, a component of the Radicalisation Monitoring Tool that was 
developed in the frame of the RAD MONITOR project. The aims of the Situation Assessment 
analysis were the following: 1) to evaluate the capacity of the Greek Ministry Of Citizen 
Protection, Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights, and Racist Violence 
Recording Network (RVRN) to collect, provide and analyse data as per the categories and 
baseline indicators presented in Table 1 and Table 2 below; 2) to identify data that is already 
collected by the respective actors; 3) to identify what data is not collected by the respective 
actors; 4) to refine the analytical framework and provide recommendations for compiling a 
comprehensive analysis report at national level; and 5) to draft a pilot Situation Assessment 
Report based on the data collected.  
 
Table 1 Overview of key categories related to hate crimes and racist violence 
Name of Categories 
Specific criminal offences 
Perpetrators of specific criminal offences 
Activities: manifestations of extremism and radicalism 
Actors: organisations, groups, movements, individuals engaged in specific areas of activity 
Extremist content on the internet (spread, nature, use, engagement, recruitment) 
Penetration of radical ideas in society (active support and (cognitive) agreement with ideas) 
 
Table 2 Overview of baseline indicators related to hate crimes and racist violence 
Name of Baseline Indicators 
Incidence (crimes of interest) 
Share in violent criminal activity 
Share in overall criminal activity 
Proportion of specific crime sub-types 
Notable events – overall count 
Participation 
Events by type 
Violent attitudes presented 
Membership in extremist or support organisation 
Agreement with extremist acts 
Agreement with radical ideas 
 
The Greek validation on far-right radicalisation drew on desk research, and collected 
information from institutional web sites, as well as publicly available reports and analyses, in 
order to identify if data along the categories and the baseline indicators contained in the RMT 
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(Annex I of Situation Assessment Report) was publicly accessible. Moreover, we sent written 
data inquiries to the competent agencies and institutions (i.e. Ministry Of Citizen Protection, 
Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights, and Racist Violence Recording 
Network), in which we requested relevant data for the past 6 years (2010-2015). Furthermore, 
we conducted qualitative semi-structured interviews with representatives of respective 
agencies and institutions. The aims of the qualitative semi-structured stakeholder interviews 
were: a) to collect information that had not been obtained through the first two methods 
(mainly related to the qualitative assessments of key indicators, threats and trends); b) to 
clarify the reasons for the absence of data along certain categories and baseline indicators set 
in Annex I and various methodological issues; and c) to discuss the potential of the respective 
agencies and institutions to collect presently missing data. In total, 3 interviews were 
conducted with representatives of respective organisations and institutions, and 1 written 
response to a questionnaire was provided for the purposes of this validation study. Based on 
the information collected, we completed a pilot Situation Assessment Report at the end of the 
validation study. The pilot Situation Assessment Report put forward an overview of 
quantitative, as well as qualitative analysis of the collected data along the categories and 
indicators listed in Annex I. 
Racist violence/hate crime has increased in Greece since 2010. Related incidents have 
occurred in all but one (i.e. Epirus) administrative regions of Greece. The largest volume of 
such incidents is observed in Attica and Central Macedonia – the largest, most populous, and 
with the highest concentration of migrants – administrative departments of the country. The 
largest increase was observed between 2011 and 2012, a period during which penetration of 
radical ideas and support to acts of extremism were at their highest levels within the Greek 
society. It is during this period that the far-right extremist party, Golden Dawn, established 
itself in the Greek parliament. 2011-2012 was also characterised by a considerable rise in the 
number of physical racist attacks against mainly third country nationals. A large number of 
these attacks inflicted life-threatening injuries to the victim(s). Furthermore, up to 2013, 
almost all recorded incidents of racist attacks concerned group attacks, while 1 out of 2 
incidents of racist violence involved the participation of members of extremist groups, 
according to the victims’ perception. All in all, up to 2013, racist violence in Greece mainly 
targeted third country nationals and was characterised by high levels of organisation and 
physical violence. At the same time, Greek society more broadly exhibited signs of 
radicalisation, which was manifested in high levels of public support for far-right radical 
ideas and acts of extremism. 
Since 2014, the characteristics of racist violence in Greece gradually started to 
change, a development which might be related to the prosecution of the vast majority of 
Golden Dawn’s MPs and leadership. More specifically, racist violence became ‘softer’ (i.e. 
verbal abuse, rather than physical racist attacks, became the predominant form of racist 
violence in the country). At the same time, it became more diffused, as the total number of 
officially recorded incidents of racist violence peaked in 2015. Racist violence also started to 
become less organised, as the lowest number of group attacks was recorded in 2015, while the 
participation of members of extremist groups in acts of racist violence appears to be 
extremely low. Furthermore, a significant increase in the number of racist attacks motivated 
by biases against the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victims was recorded, and the 
number of recorded racist attacks against both women and trans individuals also increased. 
This shift in the characteristics, modus operandi, and victims’ and perpetrators’ profiles of 
racist attacks presents Greek authorities with a considerable challenge in relation to their data 
collection and analysis capacity in monitoring the phenomenon.  
In general terms, Greek institutions demonstrate average capacity to collect and 
analyse data regarding (potential) hate crimes/incidents of racist violence. More specifically, 
the Hellenic Police has the capacity to produce indicators such as “Incidence of potential hate 
crimes”, “Share in violent criminal activity”, and “Share in overall criminal activity” 
baseline indicators, which are foreseen in the Situation Assessment Tool. However, the latter 
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two baseline indicators are not utilised by the Hellenic Police, as the share of potential hate 
crimes in overall criminal activity and violent criminal activity is statistically insignificant. 
Moreover, the Hellenic Police has the capacity to produce indicators such as “Proportion of 
hate crimes sub-types” baseline indicators, based on the data that they have at their disposal: 
“Proportion of different bias motivations in the total number of potential hate crimes” and 
“Proportion of different types of violence in the total number of potential hate crimes 
(physical/verbal)”. Finally, the Hellenic Police also utilises two additional indicators, which 
measure the efficiency of the institution, and which were not foreseen in the Situation 
Assessment Tool: “Proportion of (non-)cleared potential hate crimes in the total number of 
potential hate crimes” and “Number of prosecuted individuals per potential bias motivation”.  
Yet, the data collection and analysis capacity of the Hellenic Police can be improved 
in a number of ways. First, there is a surprising lack of data regarding notable far-right events, 
level of participation in such events, and their evolution. Hence, the Hellenic Police is not 
capable of producing indicators such as “Notable events – overall count”, “Participation”, 
“Events by type”, and “Violent attitudes presented” baseline indicators due to a lack of 
relevant data. In this respect, the Hellenic Police should try to increase their data collection 
capacity across the area of far-right events, as quite often such events pave the way for racist 
attacks.  
Secondly, the Hellenic Police should quantify the available data regarding prosecuted 
individuals for potential hate crimes. At the moment, the Hellenic Police has at its disposal 
rich raw data regarding the demographic and socioeconomic background of potential 
perpetrators of hate crimes, which can be particularly useful to the authorities when processed 
and quantified. Thirdly, in a similar way, much more information can be extracted through the 
process and quantification of raw data regarding victims’ profile.  
Last but not least, the Hellenic Police should adopt four “Proportion of hate crimes 
sub-types” baseline indicators that have been used by RVRN, and appear to be particularly 
useful in the monitoring of hate crime/racist violence trends in Greece: “Membership in 
extremist organisation”, “Share of group attacks in the total number of racist violence 
incidents per year”, “Proportion of different levels of organised violence in the total number 
of incidents of racist violence”, and “Proportion of different levels of violence in the total 
number of racist violence incidents”. In other words, the Hellenic Police should try to extract 
as much information as possible from the victims’ testimony regarding the qualitative 
characteristics of racist attacks. Finally, the Hellenic Police should start collecting data on a 
regular basis regarding online hate speech. At the moment, relevant data are collected by the 
Hellenic Police only on an ad hoc basis, which, however, cannot be utilised in the consistent 
monitoring of online hate speech. 
The Racist Violence Recording Network (hereby RVRN, in Greek Dyktio Katagrafis 
Peristatikon Ratsistikis Vias) demonstrates high data collection capacity. More specifically, 
the RVRN is capable of producing “Incidence of racist violence incidents (per administrative 
region and year)”, “Membership in extremist or support organisation”, and “Proportion of 
hate crimes sub-types” baseline indicators. With specific regard to this last indicator, the 
RVRN can produce “Proportion of different bias motivations in the total number of racist 
violence incidents”, “Proportion of different types of violence in the total number of racist 
violence incidents”, “Proportion of different levels of organised violence in the total number 
of incidents of racist violence”, “Share of group attacks in the total number of racist violence 
incidents per year”, and “Proportion of different levels of violence in the total number of 
racist violence incidents” sub-indicators. Additionally, it can produce “Proportion of 
incidents of racist violence per victim’s profile and year”, “Gender identity of racist violence 
perpetrators per year”, and “Gender identity of racist violence victims per year”. Indeed, 
some of these indicators were not foreseen in the Situation Assessment Tool, and, in this 
respect, they constitute particularly useful additions.  
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The data collection and analysis capacity of the RVRN can be improved in a number 
of ways. First, RVRN should attempt to quantify the rich qualitative data at its disposal, 
which concern the modus operandi, characteristics, perpetrators, victims, and sites of racist 
attacks. Indeed, the vast majority of the aforementioned baseline indicators are not produced 
at the moment by the RVRN, despite the availability of relevant data, due to the focus on 
purely qualitative reports. Quantitative data have a higher impact among policymakers, and, 
in this regard, the RVRN can increase its impact through the quantification of some of its 
data.  
Secondly, racist attacks against religious and ethnic minorities in Greece seem to be 
particularly underrepresented in the RVRN data. In this respect, the RVRN should improve its 
data collection capacity among these communities too. Thirdly, the RVRN should try to draw 
on public opinion survey data in order to complement its own data. Indeed, public opinion 
survey data can identify the level of penetration of radical ideas and support to extremist acts 
among the Greek society at a given time, which can be particularly useful information in the 
study of racist violence trends. Finally, the RVRN should start collecting data on a regular 
basis regarding online hate speech. Despite the fact that it constitutes a phenomenon that 
appears to be on the rise in Greece at the moment, neither State nor civil society actors have 
the capacity to monitor online hate speech. 
The General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights of the Ministry of 
Justice, Transparency and Human Rights demonstrates average data collection capacity. More 
specifically, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights is capable of 
producing the following indicators: “Total number of convicted hate crimes perpetrators”; 
“Total number of prosecuted individuals in relation to hate crimes”; “Share of cases for 
which criminal proceedings have been initiated”; and “Share of cases for which disciplinary 
measures have been taken”. Moreover, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human 
Rights has at its disposal data regarding the demographic and socioeconomic profile of 
prosecuted and convicted individuals in relation to hate crimes.  
The data collection and analysis capacity of the General Secretariat of Transparency 
and Human Rights can be improved in a number of ways. At the moment, the biggest 
challenge of the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights has to do with its 
ability to follow-up a case from the point of recording by the Hellenic Police, to the initiation 
of criminal proceedings and conclusion of the case before the court. In this respect then, the 
General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights should try to ensure the validity and 
reliability of collected data by producing a single specific template, which will be used and 
completed by competent authorities (i.e. courts and the Hellenic Police) during data collection 
process. In this way the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights will be able 
to coordinate the collection of data among all competent authorities in a more effective way. 
In this respect, it can be assisted by the newly established National Council against Racism 
and Intolerance and the regional special prosecutors for hate crimes/racist violence. Secondly, 
each incident of racist violence that is reported to the Hellenic Police, should be assigned a 
unique ID number, which will enable the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human 
Rights to follow-up each case at a later stage. Finally, the General Secretariat of Transparency 
and Human Rights should attempt to produce the aforementioned indicators. Indeed, these 
indicators are not produced at the moment by the General Secretariat of Transparency and 
Human Rights, despite the availability of relevant data and their potential usefulness in 
monitoring the phenomenon. 
 
4. Islamist radicalization 
The second component of the Greek validation study focused on Islamist radicalization. It 
specifically sought to detect the relevance of a series of causal factors and risk indicators, 
which were contained in the RMT compiled in the frame of the RAD MONITOR project, for 
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the incidence of Islamist radicalisation in Greece. The aims of this validation were: 1) to test 
which of the behaviour/actions indicators and factors at the micro and meso levels (see 
Error! Reference source not found. in Annex I) can be measured and analysed through 
qualitative assessment by social scientists; 2) to verify the appropriateness of the selected 
indicators and factors (see Error! Reference source not found. in Annex I) for the national 
context of Greece; and 3) to revise and finalise the qualitative assessment of risk factors and 
root causes of Islamist radicalisation within the Greek context. 
The validation study drew on desk research aiming to identify the scope of, and 
trends in Islamist radicalisation in Greece. It specifically sought to explore which of the 
behaviour/actions factors and risk indicators included in the RMT are relevant to the 
qualitative study of Islamist radicalisation in Greece. As this report is the first empirical study 
of Islamist radicalisation in Greece, many of the sources used are primarily from the media. 
Another method that has been used in this validation study is semi-structured stakeholder 
interviews with key government representatives/public officials, as well as academics, 
representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Imams and independent experts 
in Islamist radicalisation. A total of 8 interviews were conducted for the purposes of this 
validation study. The aim of the semi-structured stakeholder interviews was to assist in the 
identification and improvement of the factors and indicators in Annex I that are relevant to the 
validation study of Islamist radicalisation in Greece. Finally, a list of indicators that could be 
applied in the Greek context for the monitoring and understanding of the root causes of 
Islamist radicalisation has been developed.  
This validation study constitutes a preliminary attempt to approach the particularly 
under-researched issue of Islamist radicalisation in Greece, and aims to produce valuable 
insights for further future research on the topic. Contrary to what was originally foreseen in 
the project, we were not able to pilot the list of indicators in specific localities and Muslim 
communities, who are considered to be at risk of Islamist radicalisation. The reason is that 
there has not been (so far at least) any home-grown and organized Islamist radicalization in 
Greece. The non-existence of native Islamist fighters radicalised in the country, and the 
limited number of and lack of information about Muslim migrants who had resided in the past 
and became radicalised in Greece are the main reasons why piloting the monitoring tool was 
not feasible.  
A list of indicators that can be potentially applied in the Greek context in order to 
monitor Islamist radicalisation and understand its root causes has been developed (see Table 
1). These indicators have been extracted from the risk assessment indicators in the RMT that 
the RAD MONITOR project developed, and they have been fine-tuned following our 
interviewees’ comments and recommendations in order to fit better with the Greek context. It 
should be noted at this point that the provided indicators usually work in combination with 
others and that they cannot be used as standalone signifiers of trends of radicalisation. 
 
Table 1 Factors and measurable indicators that could be applied in the Greek context 
for monitoring Islamist radicalisation 
Behaviour/actions Cognitive indicators 
(attitudes, beliefs, 
convictions) 
Situational factors / 
background conditions 
Triggering factors 
MICRO LEVEL (INDIVIDUAL) 
Suggestive 
- ‘cutting ties with family 
and friends – social 
Suggestive 
- ‘openly voicing grievances’ 
(Note: in their own language 
Suggestive 




withdrawal’ combined with 
‘seeking or having contacts 
with a charismatic person or 
spiritual advisor’ (Note: it 
does not apply to Christian 
converts to Islam) 
- ‘attending rallies for 
extremist causes’ (Note: 
‘extremist causes’ need to be 
defined/listed beforehand) 
- ‘travel to risk 
countries/conflict zones’ 
(Note: ‘risk countries’ need 
to be carefully defined/listed; 
use indicator with caution, 
and always combine with 
other suggestive and ‘red 
flag’ indicators) 
- ‘received combat / military 
training’ (Note: Use with 
caution as combat and 
military training are 
mandatory and/or a cultural 
tradition in some 
countries/regions) 
and in their own community; 
subsequently, close 
cooperation between 
authorities and communities 
is essential in order monitor 
this attitude) 
- ‘expressing dichotomous 
worldview’ (Note: close 
cooperation between 
authorities and communities 
is essential in order monitor 
this attitude) 
Traumatic Stress Disorder) 
- ‘history of violence’ (Note: 
the term ‘violence’ needs to 
be defined) 
- ‘prison experience’ (Note: 
use with caution, as 
administrative detention of 
asylum seekers is particularly 
widespread in Greece) 
- ‘financial problems’ (Note: 
use with caution, and take 
into account the present 
economic situation in Greece) 
- ‘education and employment 
situation’ (Note: use with 
caution, and take into account 
the present economic 
situation in Greece) 
- ‘family problems’ (Note: 
take into account the 
potential de- and/or counter-
radicalisation dynamics that 
might be developed in 
extended Middle Eastern 
families) 
Red Flag 
- ‘contacts with radical 
groups locally or abroad’ 
(Note: ‘radical groups’ need 
to be carefully defined/listed) 
- ‘possessing or 
disseminating extremist 
literature and paraphernalia 
or online materials’ (Note: it 
should be carefully defined 
what constitutes ‘extremist’ 
literature and paraphernalia) 
Red Flag 
- ‘openly voicing support for 
terrorist organisations and 
causes’ (Note: ‘terrorist 
organisations’ need to be 
carefully defined/listed) 
- ‘openly expressing certain 
attitudes supporting violence, 
or against an expressed target 
revenge or death rhetoric’ 
 
Triggers 
- ‘personal trauma or crisis 
event’ 
- ‘victimisation or conflict 
situation’ 
- ‘perception of international 
or local events’ 
MESO LEVEL (GROUP, COMMUNITY) 
Suggestive 
- ‘instances of members of 
community implementing 
security measures, secrecy, 
other rituals/suspicious group 
Suggestive 
- ‘instances of community 
members expressing 
disrespect for (secular) 
authorities’ (Note: Such 
Suggestive 
- ‘lack of trust in public 
institutions’ 
- ‘exclusion from political 
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activities’ (Note: such 
instances have not been 
observed in Greece yet) 
- ‘foreign religious 
emissaries active in locality’ 
(Note: This indicator doesn’t 
indicate anything in itself. It 
needs to be combined with 
intelligence regarding the 
profile of foreign religious 
emissaries) 
- ‘activities of new/unknown 
informal organisations, 
foundations’ (Note: Use with 
caution – only if these 
organisations have the 
opportunity for regularisation 
and avoid it, they need to be 
monitored) 
- ‘leaders spreading 
narratives and materials 
glorifying violence’ 
- ‘military and combat 
training provision’ 
- ‘members of community 
having contacts with or 
supporting transiting foreign 
fighters’ 
instances have been observed 
in Western Thrace with 
respect to ethnic 
radicalisation. It is assumed 
that it can be an effective 
indicator regarding cases of 
Islamist radicalisation too) 
- ‘hate speech by 
community/group leaders’ 
process’ 
- ‘segregation of migrant 
communities’ 
- ‘rise of a strong 
radical/conservative Muslim 
leadership’ (Note: proposed 
instead of ‘lack of strong 
moderate Muslim leadership’ 
indicator) 
  Triggers 
- ‘social, religious, ethnic 
conflicts and tensions’ 
 
Currently the threat level originating from Islamist radicalisation in Greece is 
considered by senior intelligence officials to be ‘very low’. Greece was not a major player in 
the ‘War on Terror’, as the country did not deploy any troops in Iraq, while the troops in 
Afghanistan participated mainly in low visibility, low risk engineering and medical activities 
as well as training missions. Moreover, Muslims hold a positive view of Greece, which is an 
ancient civilisation that did not have any involvement in the colonial wars. Furthermore, 
Greece has had good relationships with the Arab world, which started to develop in the early 
1980s.  
However, there are various reasons to believe that Greece might be perceived by 
Islamists as an appealing potential target, despite the fact that it lacks the symbolism and 
strategic interest that such groups seek. Indeed, there are fears that radical Islamist groups 
could participate in low-risk assignments, such as recruitment, funding, propaganda and 
training. In fact, recent police operations have uncovered an increased, very low key and 
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behind the scenes, activity of international Muslim terrorists in the country, which has been 
limited so far to the creation of a logistical and support basis for operations abroad. In this 
regard, Greek authorities have been at a ‘heightened state of vigilance’ regarding the use of 
the country as a transit destination to and from Middle East battlefields already since 
September 2014. 
In this regard, we address the following recommendations to the competent national 
authorities in order to pre-emptively monitor Islamist radicalisation in the country: 
1. Representatives of both the Hellenic Police and Muslim communities in Greece have 
confirmed the high level of cooperation between them. However, this cooperation is 
informal, and it certainly does not reach all Muslim migrant communities. Hence, the 
Hellenic Police and National Intelligence Service should formalise their relations 
with Muslim communities through the employment of cherry-picked Muslim 
migrants. This measure will immediately improve the monitoring capacity of the 
authorities, will extend their reach to previously inaccessible communities, and will 
formalise the cooperation between law enforcement agencies and Muslim migrant 
communities.  
2. Migrant Integration Councils, which exist in several municipalities in Greece, have 
proven to be fairly effective in addressing the needs of migrant communities in the 
country, at least in the municipalities in which they operate. These local government 
structures include the participation of the largest migrant communities, and they are 
in a position to attend to local concerns and intra-community changes.  Where they 
operate, the Migrant Integration Councils seem to be the ideal platform for an 
improved cooperation between the leadership of migrant communities and local 
authorities, and for alleviating grievances that sometimes can provide fertile ground 
for Islamist radicalisation. 
3. Finally, informal mosques should be given incentives to become regularised. 
Recently introduced legislation provides for the regularisation of informal places of 
worship. At the moment, however, the vast majority of informal mosques abstain 
from this opportunity for regularisation, which is tolerated by the Greek State. In this 
respect, the Greek State, instead of being indifferent or persecute those informal 
mosques that opt out of regularisation, should provide them with regularisation 
incentives.  
 
 
